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North Korea and Support to 
Terrorism: An Evolving History
By Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.1
Introduction
The DPRK's (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or North Korea) sup-
port for terrorism began as an ideologically-based policy financed by the 
Soviet Union that eventually led to a policy designed to put money into 
the coffers of the elite in Pyongyang—in short, a "proliferation for hire" 
policy.2 This article articulates a brief history of the North Korean regime, 
the rise to power of Kim Il-sung and his son, Kim Jong-il, and North 
Korea's persistent support to terrorist groups around the globe.
North Korea's Beginnings and Kim Il-sung's Rise to 
Power
The history of the present North Korean regime began during World War 
II (WWII). During that war, there were several partisan groups that 
fought with and under the command of both Soviet and Chinese military 
forces. One of these groups was led by Kim Il-sung, a young commander 
picked by the Soviets to help lead his new nation (North Korea) following 
the end of WWII. The DPRK in its infancy was closely supervised by 
Soviet "advisers," and largely subsidized by the Soviet Union. Its military 
forces also utilized Soviet doctrines in their operations and training.3 
During the Korean War, which was initiated by North Korea based on a 
plan drawn up with the advice and supervision of Soviet advisors, Kim Il-
sung developed a relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
The PRC came to his aid following a near collapse of DPRK forces after 
the battle of Inchon and the ensuing push north of American-led United 
Nations (UN) forces in 1950. The PRC dedicated large numbers of mili-
tary forces to the war at the request of Stalin—who provided funding, 
logistics, and military equipment to both the PRC and North Korea. Even-
tually, more than a million Chinese troops were fighting in the Korean 
theater of operations by war's end.4 This was the beginning of a relation-
ship that Pyongyang would have with both the Soviet Union and the PRC 
until the end of the Cold War.
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Kim Il-sung's Consolidation of Power
Kim was formally "appointed" the leader of North Korea by the Soviets in 
1948 (but had been the de facto Soviet appointed leader from 1945 on), 
and "elected" as the "Premier of the Republic" during the same time 
frame.5 Despite the backing of his Soviet supporters, from 1945 until the 
late 1950s, Kim Il-sung had anything but a complete consolidation of 
power. Of course, the Korean War limited his complete control of the 
country, but perhaps equally as importantly, Kim was also faced with both 
pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions in his own Supreme People's Assem-
bly and other key governmental institutions. Between 1955 and 1958, Kim 
Il-sung purged all or most of those in both the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet 
factions within the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) and all other aspects of 
government and society. By 1958 all Chinese troops had been withdrawn 
from North Korea.6 These events finally left Kim in complete control of 
the country, its economy, government, society, and military forces. The 
legacy of totalitarianism continues today through his son, Kim Jong-il.
The elder Kim's rise to power reflected the traditional isolationism of 
Korean society for hundreds of years and its resistance to outside influ-
ence.7 It also reflected a Confucianist tradition of absolute loyalty to an 
individual leader—which was the end result by 1958. North Korea contin-
ued to receive massive amounts of aid from Moscow, and to a lesser 
extent, from Beijing—but neither of these nations had a significant impact 
on how the country was run.8
North Korea's Foreign Policy Goals and Support for 
Terrorism: 1960–1988
North Korea from 1948 until the end of the Cold War could be described 
as a nation-state that fell within the Soviet sphere of influence. But it was 
also a nation that was far more isolated in every way than even other com-
munist states—including countries like China and Cuba. It was this isola-
tionism that kept the Stalinist government of Kim Il-sung "pure," and 
allowed him to completely dominate all aspects of government and soci-
ety in North Korea. This North Korean philosophy, formally defined by 
Pyongyang as "juche," (self-reliance) is what kept the DPRK an active 
communist state, but also avoided its dominance by larger, more powerful 
sponsors or neighbors like the Soviet Union or the PRC.9
Despite the fact that Kim Il-sung was free to pursue a policy that suited 
his perceived needs of a militarily-strong North Korea, a Stalinist-Juche 
government, and the unification of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea 
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simply could not afford to focus on these issues without external support. 
The entire country, for example, was completely subsidized by the Soviet 
Union until 1990 and continues to require substantial outside resources 
to this day. These resources include the majority of foodstuffs, oil for its 
industry and cities, and even the maintenance of the national electrical 
grid. North Korea is a country that is seventy percent mountainous, and 
thus has been incapable of agrarian self-sufficiency.10 In addition, it does 
not have enough coal or oil to sustain its economy—and struggles to gar-
ner finances for fossil fuels needed to sustain its economy. These condi-
tions led to one of the most profound and threatening aspects of the Cold 
War—proxy operations.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both 
engaged in proxy operations, where each nation targeted each other, but 
on the soil of other nation-states. Occasionally, these proxy battles 
involved non-state actors and terrorist groups. Thus, North Korea's sup-
port for terrorism and terrorist groups during the 1960s–1980s allowed it 
to maintain its sovereignty and independent policy goals while still "pay-
ing back" Moscow for massive subsidies that kept its government afloat.11
As a key part of fitting into the Soviet sphere of influence and "pulling 
their weight" among Moscow's allies, the North Koreans actively sup-
ported communist and Marxist movements. Key among these operations 
was the long-lasting war in Angola, where by 1984 there were 3,000 
North Korean regular troops and 1,000 advisors. North Korea also oper-
ated training camps in Angola for guerrillas of the African National Con-
gress (ANC) and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). 
Both organizations were trained in terrorist tactics at these camps. But 
North Korea operated far more guerrilla and terrorist training camps 
within its own borders. Between 1968 and 1988, North Korea built and 
operated at least 30 special training camps within its borders, specializing 
in terrorist and guerilla warfare training. Reports at the time indicated 
that over 5,000 recruits from some 25 nations visited these camps to take 
part in various courses lasting anywhere from three to 18 months.12 
Support for nation-states engaging in terrorist tactics was not the only 
activity that the North Koreans engaged in at their camps up until the late 
1980s. In fact, Pyongyang supported a number of terrorist groups—
particularly in the Middle East. According to National Security analyst 
Barry Rubin, "Up until the late 1980s, North Korea trained Palestinian 
terrorists, both those belonging to the PLO and from Syrian and Libyan-
backed groups." Rubin further states:
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"In Lebanon during the 1970s and in Libya and Syria from the 
1980s down to the present, North Korean soldiers have also 
trained terrorists for many groups including the Basque Spanish 
ETA, Palestinian Abu Nidal organization, Irish Republican Army, 
Italian Red Brigades, Japanese Red Army, Moro National Libera-
tion Front in the Philippines, Turkish radicals, and others. While 
many of these links have lapsed, in the 1990s, North Korea added 
Hizbollah and the anti-Turkish Kurdish PKK group to its roster of 
clients."13
According to reports from French press sources, several key Hizbollah 
operatives spent time in North Korea. They included (but were probably 
not limited to) Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hizbollah; 
Security and Intelligence chief Ibrahim Akil; and Mustapha Badreddine, 
head of counter-espionage operations.14 On April 30, 1996, during a spe-
cial press briefing given at the U.S. State Department, Ambassador Philip 
C. Wilcox, U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of 
State stated, "In the 1970s and '80s, North Korea had a very serious 
record of committing very serious acts of international terrorism."15 
North Korea has also been involved with the Japanese Red Army (JRA) 
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In their 
book, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, 
Stéphane Courtois and Mark Kramer say:
"Created at the end of the 1960s, when student radicalism in 
Japan was at its height and Maoism was in the air, the JRA 
quickly made contact with North Korean agents (the Korean com-
munity is quite large throughout the Japanese archipelago). The 
Korean agents passed instructions to their cadres and brought the 
arms the JRA was lacking, but they were unable to prevent a split 
in the group in the early 1970s, which resulted in a bloody conflict 
between the dissenting and orthodox factions. Accordingly, some 
of the cadres simply defected to North Korea, taking refuge in 
Pyongyang, where they remain as businessmen and intermediar-
ies with the West. The other faction decided to internationalize its 
affairs even further, and joined up with Wadi Hadad. As a result 
of this alliance, three members of the JRA acted on behalf of the 
PFLP in killing 28 people at Tel Aviv's Lod airport in May 1972."16
The evidence chain connecting the North Korean Government to the 
PFLP is further cemented by proof that its leader, Dr. George Habash, 
made a visit to North Korea during September of 1970—a trip where he 
was reportedly able to procure both weapons and funding.17
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The reasons for North Korean support of state and non-state actors dur-
ing the Cold War were actually twofold. First, it confirmed North Korea's 
position as a stout ally within the Soviet sphere of influence and was one 
of the factors that kept the enormous subsidies coming. Second, it was an 
active element in North Korea's policy at the time (and now) to actively 
support state and non-state actors who, like Pyongyang, were hostile to 
the United States and its allies. One cannot forget that North Korea then—
and now—regarded the United States as its primary enemy and its main 
threat to national survival. The PFLP targeted Israel, one of Washington's 
key allies and its most important ally in the Middle East. Thus, supporting 
terrorist groups that targeted Israeli citizens and Jews from other nations 
was an important element in keeping Washington's efforts focused on 
these terrorist acts—and not on North Korea. North Korea continues to 
follow this policy, as described in the next section.18
North Korea's Continued Support of Terrorism
Hizbollah
According to sources in both the American and Israeli press, North Korea 
supervised the building of underground facilities for Hizbollah in south-
ern Lebanon. According to several reports, all or most of Hizbollah's 
underground facilities were built primarily under the supervision of 
North Korean instructors in 2003–2004. The facilities were quite exten-
sive and included dispensaries for the wounded, food stocks, and arms 
dumps.19 It seems likely that North Korean assistance to Hizbollah served 
as a key factor in the challenges that Israeli military forces faced when 
they conducted combat operations against Hizbollah during the 2006 
conflict. Israeli reporter Lenny Ben-David in 2007 stated that, "Hizbul-
lah's military bases, armories, bunkers and communications networks 
were much more extensive than Israel's intelligence services estimated on 
the eve of the 2006 war." Ben-David also reported that the tunnel build-
ing operations were under the control of the Korea Mining Development 
Trading Corporation (KMDTC). KMDTC is a company that has been offi-
cially sanctioned by the United States for its illicit activities.20
North Korea also reportedly exported arms to Hizbollah that were used to 
inflict casualties on Israeli troops and civilians. An article written by 
South Korean scholar Moon Chung-in asserts that the Israeli intelligence 
service Mossad has clear evidence that Hizbollah was able to hit the out-
skirts of Tel Aviv with short-range missiles containing components sup-
plied by North Korea. According to Moon's report, the missile 
components first went from North Korea to Iran. The Iranians assembled 
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the missiles and then transported them to Hizbollah via Syria.21 There are 
also reports of arms shipments originating in North Korea that ended up 
in the hands of Hizbollah. The "Reform Party in Syria" (RPS), an opposi-
tion group, reported in 2008 that Hizbollah had acquired chemical war-
fare (CW) agents from North Korea. According to RPS, mustard and nerve 
gas were acquired from Pyongyang, with Syria acting as a conduit. The 
CW agents can reportedly be weaponized and mounted on Hizbollah's 
short-range missiles that target Israel.22 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
North Korea's ties to Hizbollah began in collaboration with yet another 
organization identified by the U.S. State Department as an entity 
supporting terrorism—the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).23 
According to a 2008 Congressional Research Report, the North Koreans 
collaborated with IRGC operatives (including active duty military 
generals) in Hizbollah operations that included everything from the 
shipment of short-range missiles and artillery, to the building of 
underground facilities.24 
Tamil Tigers
North Korea also has had connections to insurgents and terrorist groups 
in South Asia. In 2000, a video of an attack by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) on 
a Sri Lankan navy ship showed speedboats that appeared to be of North 
Korean origin. The video showed that the rebel group was also using a 
North Korean variant of a Russian (and later Chinese) 107mm Katyusha 
rocket launcher.25 A Jane's Intelligence Review article claimed that the 
armaments being used by the LTTE were of North Korean origin:
"In the video, LTTE Sea Tigers can be seen using a variant of the 
107mm Katyusha rocket, fired from a lightweight tripod, in pairs. 
This is believed to be a variant of the Chinese Type 63 107mm 
launcher. The Chinese produce a single tube version called a Type 
85 fired from a man-portable tripod, but the North Koreans pro-
duce a double version. This is quite a rare weapon…."26
The North Koreans also attempted to provide the LTTE at least one ship-
ment of 152mm and 130mm artillery shells and 120mm mortars during 
2007. The Sri Lankan Navy interdicted the shipment. The Sri Lankan 
Navy also seized an LTTE boat that was equipped with a 14.5mm machine 
gun that was also assessed to be connected with North Koreans.27 North 
Korean merchant ships carrying arms to the LTTE were intercepted by 
the Sri Lankan Navy on three different occasions in October 2006, Febru-
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ary 2007, and March 2007. On several occasions the North Korean mer-
chant ships fired on the Sri Lankan vessels, and the Sri Lankan Navy 
reportedly sank two of the North Korean ships. The Congressional 
Research Service issued a report in 2008 citing the Sankei Shimbun in 
Japan, which states the Sri Lankan Government filed an official protest 
with the North Koreans.28
Conclusion
North Korea has demonstrated throughout its history the intent and 
capability to support terrorism. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the 
North Korean leadership both fears and resents the Government of the 
United States and its allies. Proliferation of training, weapons, and tech-
nology to non-state actors who engage in terrorist acts against America's 
allies in the Middle East (particularly Israel) is perceived by Pyongyang to 
be an effective way of ratcheting up contentious issues with Washington. 
Second, economics has played an important role in Pyongyang's motiva-
tions for supporting terrorism, largely because North Korea's stability 
originally depended on subsidies from the Soviet Union. Support for ter-
rorism also provides the badly-needed hard currency for Pyongyang's 
elite. Containing and combating North Korea's support for terrorism will 
continue to be a foreign policy dilemma for the United States as long as 
the current regime is in place.
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